Thailand's referendum

The long march back to the barracks

Aug 23rd 2007
From The Economist print edition

There may be such a thing as a good coup; Thailand's was certainly not one

Getty Images

FROM Pakistan to Fiji, from Bangladesh to Thailand, the men in green are finding what they should have known all along: that it is far easier for soldiers to topple an elected government than to manage their own exit from the front of the political stage. Many generals, however, never learn that lesson. What is surprising in Thailand, which on August 19th held a referendum designed to smooth their exit (see article), is that so many of the country's elite cheered them on when they staged their coup a year ago. Critics of the coup—such as this newspaper—were denounced for misunderstanding both the depth of the evil of Thaksin Shinawatra, the prime minister they deposed, and the wonders of Thailand itself.

We had no fondness for Mr Thaksin: the human-rights abuses perpetrated by the security forces on his watch were deplorable and some of his nationalist economic policies were loopy. But he had a mandate. His Thai Rak Thai (TRT) party won 375 of the 500 lower-house seats in the last valid election, in 2005. Democracy produces some nasty leaders. But that is no reason for ditching it. Even the best-intentioned coups leave an ugly mess, such as that now facing Thailand.

In the referendum voters approved the new constitution the generals want to foist on them. But it is difficult to see the vote as a ringing endorsement of the new charter itself, let alone as a vindication of last September's coup. Turnout was low; the winning majority even lower; and an unknown share of those who voted yes will have done so only to move the country on towards the elections promised for December, after which, it is hoped, the soldiers will quit politics.

The charter is designed to prevent the re-emergence of an elected strongman like Mr Thaksin. To this end, it contains some unobjectionable measures, such as reducing the number of parliamentarians needed to call a vote of no confidence in the prime minister and strengthening the powers of the national human-rights commission. Public criticism forced the army to drop some egregiously undemocratic clauses, such as the provision for a “national crisis council”, including army officers, to take charge in any future political conflict. However, some dubious bits remain: almost half of the Senate will be appointed by a panel of judges and bureaucrats; and the coupmakers themselves are granted a blanket amnesty.

Even with the “crisis council” expunged from the constitution, the spectre of the army whipping up a crisis to justify seizing power again has not quite gone away. Now that the constitution has passed, the generals may have another go at pushing through a draconian security law, giving the army sweeping new powers to override the elected government and make arrests, search homes without warrants and impose curfews and censorship. All this in the name of combating threats to “internal security”, defined so broadly that the army could treat pretty well any dissent as such.

Built-in weakness

In May a constitutional tribunal created by the junta found the TRT guilty of electoral fraud and dissolved it. But the charter-drafters wanted to make it harder for any other dominant majority party to emerge in future. For that reason, the new constitution tweaks the voting system in favour of smaller parties. This is ironic: the whole point of Thailand's last democratic constitution, passed in 1997, was to free the country from the cycle of weak and unstable coalitions and frequent coups. The danger is now that the charter will succeed too well and Thailand will be back to weak governments.

This would suit the military-royalist elite. They could go back to running the country from behind the scenes. But there is a risk of stagnation. Thailand's economy is already growing slower than its neighbours' in part because of the continuing political uncertainty. A fractious coalition government, or one run by bumbling generals, might make things worse.

The new constitution is Thailand's 18th since the end of absolute monarchy in 1932 and, sadly, may not be its last. The army may have doomed Thailand to further cycles of constitution, crisis and coup. The next flashpoint may not be far off. Hundreds of Mr Thaksin's former MPs have regrouped under the banner of the People's Power Party (PPP). Since Mr Thaksin and his populist policies retain wide support, the PPP may enter the election campaign as front-runner. But the generals will surely do their damnedest to thwart a Thaksinite restoration. If they fight dirty, the relatively small anti-junta protests seen so far could quickly swell. The road back to the barracks is, as ever, strewn with hazards.

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Asia

Thailand's political stand-off

Penalty shoot-out

Jun 28th 2007 | BANGKOK
From The Economist print edition

The game is not over yet, despite the goals the junta has scored

AFP Has Thaksin bought the right team?

THAKSIN SHINAWATRA, Thailand's deposed prime minister, has been basking in the limelight this week over his takeover bid for Manchester City, an English football club. But back home the military junta that removed Mr Thaksin nine months ago has begun scoring goals against him. Prosecutors have filed the first corruption charges against Mr Thaksin. The military-installed government is threatening to extradite him from Britain over other allegations of crookery. Most of his fortune has been seized by investigators. His Thai Rak Thai party has been disbanded and he and over 100 cronies have been barred from politics for five years.

Mr Thaksin's supporters and other opponents of the military junta continue to stage rallies in front of Bangkok's Grand Palace. But attendance is falling short of the tens of thousands they expected. The blows to Mr Thaksin's comeback plans have encouraged General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, the junta leader, to resile from earlier promises not to cling to power. In a television interview on June 25th he hinted at plans to enter politics after he retires as army chief in September, not denying a suggestion that a new party might be created for him. No doubt entirely coincidentally, the very next day a group of former allies and foes of Mr Thaksin launched Ruam Jai Thai (Thai Unity), a new party that “would not be unfriendly to the military”, as one put it.

Mr Thaksin's chances of a swift return to power have been badly dented by the legal moves against him. But, to continue the footballing metaphor, the final whistle is still some way off and the match may well go into extra time. Assuming Mr Thaksin's takeover of Manchester City is approved by the British authorities, his plan is to hire Sven Goran Eriksson, a former manager of England's national side, giving him a big budget to buy new players and transform the team's lacklustre record of recent years. In football-crazy Thailand, this would keep Mr Thaksin in the news.

In the meantime, he promises to fight the allegations against him. Bringing charges is one thing; making them stick in the Thai courts is quite another. Mr Thaksin should also be able to delay for years any moves to extradite him, and perhaps thwart them altogether. Under British law, extradition is forbidden if the defendant can show (as Mr Thaksin claims) that the charges are politically motivated or his basic rights are otherwise at risk. General Sonthi's recent comment that he could not guarantee Mr Thaksin's safety if he returned did sound like a veiled threat.

A constitution-writing body set up by the junta has, under public pressure, cut the most undemocratic bits of a draft charter that it will soon put to a referendum. But the generals are still doing plenty to make themselves unpopular. Besides contemplating extending their rule by electoral means, they are also planning a law that would give Internal Security Operations Command, an army-run body, drastic powers to seize control of the state in the event of a “security threat”.

Besides awarding themselves a huge increase in the official defence budget, military chiefs have installed themselves on the boards of state firms, from which, it is alleged, they are seeking big, secret contributions to army funds. The graft-busting bodies set up by the junta have enthusiastically pursued Mr Thaksin's dubious land deals while finding technicalities to prevent them investigating a questionable land purchase by General Surayud Chulanont, the prime minister.

The danger is that, as happened after Thailand's last coup, in 1991, rising public anger at the generals' attempts to cling to power may eventually lead to violence. Even if the elections promised for late this year take place and return a civilian government, it may be a weak, unstable coalition. Meanwhile, if all goes well, Mr Thaksin will be sitting comfortably in the directors' box at the City of Manchester Stadium, hoping one day to be welcomed home as a hero, his misdeeds forgotten.

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Asia

Thailand

The party is over

May 31st 2007 | BANGKOK
From The Economist print edition

In two landmark legal rulings, Thailand and (see article) Malaysia take steps away from democracy and freedom

AFP

THE nine judges of Thailand's Constitutional Tribunal took ten hours to outline in a marathon session, televised live on May 30th, the electoral-fraud cases against the country's two main political parties (and several small ones). They explained in elaborate detail why Thai Rak Thai (TRT), the largest, was being disbanded, whereas its main opponent, the Democrat party, was cleared of all charges. However, the elegance of their legal arguments may be lost on millions of Thais. They gave TRT sweeping election victories in 2001 and 2005 and probably still support the party and its leader, Thaksin Shinawatra. As voters may see it, the country's most popular party has been destroyed by a court set up by the military junta that seized power last year, claiming to be rescuing democracy.

A week before the tribunal's rulings, Thailand's revered King Bhumibol (pictured above) intervened, giving warning that his realm was “close to sinking” and noting that “political parties must exist”. This raised hopes that the tribunal would stop short of dissolving either main party, and punish only individual politicians. Those hopes have been dashed.

In four months of hearings, the tribunal examined allegations of misbehaviour by the accused parties during a snap election Mr Thaksin had called in April last year. The Democrats and other parties boycotted the election, claiming it would be unfair. The courts later found grounds to annul the results, after the king urged them to sort out the “mess”. TRT was accused among other things of bribing small parties to take part in the election, while the Democrats were accused of inducing leaders of smaller parties to make false accusations against TRT.

After the coup, the junta, led by the army chief, General Sonthi Boonyaratglin, replaced the Constitutional Court with a new tribunal, whose judges it selected, and told it to pursue the electoral-fraud cases. The junta also appointed an interim government of old soldiers and bureaucrats; and created a temporary parliament and another unelected body to write a new constitution. The generals also set up investigations into the allegations of corruption and abuse of power by the Thaksin administration, while their interim government sought to borrow some of its policies, such as cheap health care and development funds for rural villages, which had made “Thaksinomics” so popular.

However, although the corruption investigations have unearthed enough evidence to press charges, they failed to find enough of a “smoking gun” to wreck Mr Thaksin's reputation irreparably. Meanwhile, the interim government has dithered and bungled, dragging down the economy and making Thaksinomics, for all its other flaws, look good. And Mr Thaksin, through a series of stunts such as bidding for Britain's Manchester City football club, has ensured he is not forgotten.

This week's judgment would appear to eliminate TRT and prevent any comeback by Mr Thaksin and his henchmen. But the generals are far from being in the clear. Lesser figures in TRT may regroup and find ways to recapture the party's millions of votes, in the elections the junta promises to hold by the year's end.

That is if things get that far. The junta's constitution-writing body has already backtracked on several undemocratic clauses it tried to slip into the new charter, such as permitting an unelected prime minister and allowing for a “crisis council”, including military chiefs, to step in and solve political conflicts. But other unpopular provisions—such as having the Senate appointed by judges and bureaucrats rather than elected—remain in the draft. So voters, angry at the destruction of the party many support, may reject the proposed charter in the referendum the junta is promising to hold. The mobilisation of police and soldiers ordered by the jumpy generals to head off protests, and their censorship of pro-Thaksin websites and radio stations, may not be enough to prevent rising popular unrest against the regime, despite Mr Thaksin's call on his supporters to accept the verdict.

Local newspapers had quoted one of the nine judges as saying they would “apply the spirit ” of the coup-makers in making their rulings. This, plus the severity of the punishment meted out to Mr Thaksin and his party, and the absolution of the Democrats, will only raise suspicions that the destruction of TRT was a pre-determined outcome. Hopes of a peaceful move back to democracy have dimmed.

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AsiaGet article background

Politics in Thailand

Battles ahead

Apr 19th 2007 | BANGKOK
From The Economist print edition

Now the hot season really begins

DURING the Songkran (new year) festival, which ended this week, Thais throw water at each other to cool off during the warmest part of the year. Politically, the end of the holidays may herald an even hotter season. A peaceful return to democracy, with elections in December, as the military-backed government promises, is possible. But mass street protests, as seen before last year's coup, are likely to return, and may have nasty consequences.

People's Television, a group of supporters of the deposed prime minister, Thaksin Shinawatra, plans big anti-coup demonstrations. It is taking to the streets after the government blocked its pro-Thaksin satellite channel. Across the political divide, the People's Alliance for Democracy, which ran last year's anti-Thaksin rallies, came back to life this month and threatens protests if the junta breaks its promise to root out Thaksinism. 

One catalyst for conflict is a new constitution, the first draft of which, written by a group largely chosen by the generals, was completed on April 17th. The draft will be debated publicly, fine-tuned, then put to a referendum in September. Pro-democracy groups are angry because, among other things, it proposes replacing the elected Senate with one chosen by a panel of judges and bureaucrats.

There is the graver risk, for the junta, of voters treating the referendum as a plebiscite on their stumbling government, led by General Surayud Chulanont, the prime minister. Many rural Thais still support Mr Thaksin. The fickle urban elite, many of whose members welcomed the tanks last September, has lost faith. Political tension has weakened the economy and accusations of graft and nepotism by junta members have surfaced.

The junta might scrap the referendum if it expects to lose it, reckons Thitinan Pongsudhirak, a political scientist. If it then tries to impose a constitution of its own choosing, this may create more trouble. Mr Thaksin's Thai Rak Thai party says the generals are actually courting trouble, as an excuse to cling to power.

Anti-Thaksin groups suspect that General Surayud is seeking a deal with Mr Thaksin that would let him off with no more than a temporary ban from politics and some tax-dodging fines in return for not making trouble. Such suspicions mounted this month when prosecutors dropped charges against Mr Thaksin of lèse-majesté—an important pretext for the coup. These charges may have been dropped, however, less to appease Mr Thaksin than to protect Thailand's international standing from the consequences of bringing another such lèse-majesté case so soon after a Swiss man was jailed (then pardoned) for defacing the king's portrait.

General Surayud did not want to be prime minister and was not the junta's first choice. It seems to have lost whatever confidence it had in him; when he briefly checked into hospital on April 9th, he appeared to be checking out of office. But the flowers the king sent him were seen as royal encouragement to soldier on.

The coup was the last chance for the army's royalist old guard, led by General Prem Tinsulanonda, the king's chief adviser, to remove Mr Thaksin before he replaced them with his own cronies. But the former prime minister has not yet been knocked out and the struggle continues. General Surayud may want peaceful compromise but this, Supavud Saicheua, an analyst at Phatra Securities, noted this week, is like asking two boxers who dislike and mistrust each other to fight a championship bout without hurting each other, and then to agree to call it a draw.

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Thailand

Rebranding Thaksinomics

Jan 11th 2007 | BANGKOK
From The Economist print edition

And wrecking the economy, with the UN's ill-judged backing

IGNORING warnings that foreign firms might pull out, on January 9th Thailand's military-backed government announced tighter restrictions on foreign ownership of local companies. The stockmarket, battered by December's botched curbs on currency inflows, a spate of bombs in Bangkok and rumours of power struggles in the army, fell further. So the government backtracked on some of the changes, further denting its credibility.

The government's espousal of a “sufficiency economy” theory, developed by King Bhumibol, further fuelled suspicions that it plans a partial retreat from Thailand's hitherto liberal economic stance. No, insisted the prime minister, General Surayud Chulanont, the sufficiency economy “does not by any means imply a rejection of globalisation”. So what does it mean? The general was launching a report on Thailand by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which promised to answer that very question. It explains that the sufficiency theory is for sustainability, moderation and broad-based development; and against excessive risk-taking, inequality and other evils.

The king developed his theory during the 1997 Asian economic crisis, when the consequences of years of reckless growth caught up with Thailand. But Thailand's finances are now much more solid and great progress has been made in bringing health care and education to the rural poor—as the royal theory proposes. Like so many generals, the leaders of last September's coup seem to be fighting the last war.

Judged by the sufficiency theory's own tenets, the five-year government of Thaksin Shinawatra, the deposed prime minister, was wondrous. His “30-baht health plan”, offering treatments for less than a dollar, helped cut poverty sharply. Yet his government ran a surplus most years (the new one plans a deficit), cut public debt and built big currency reserves. There were extensive programmes to help rural villagers find new sources of income.

However, the UNDP report goes out of its way not to mention the Thaksin government or its policies. There is no discussion of how the new “sufficiency” policies will differ from Mr Thaksin's—just an uncritical lauding of the new government's five-year plan as “the biggest shift in Thailand's economic orientation in over two decades” and much praise for royal projects.

The sufficiency theory talks of “immunising” the national economy against shocks. So far, the military government only seems to be creating shocks. As a result, growth is set to slow, and with it Thailand's progress in cutting poverty. Neither the UNDP's report, nor the many speeches launching it, discussed such awkward truths. The generals, having struggled to pin charges on Mr Thaksin, now want to airbrush him from public consciousness, to thwart any comeback. This week they told Thai broadcasters to stop quoting him.

The autocratic businessman-turned-politician was careful to attach a personal brand to his popular policies. Many are now having the label removed: the 30-baht treatment fee is being dropped, so cheap or free health care can no longer be called by a name linked to Mr Thaksin. Overall, the generals want to overwrite his brand with the only stronger one in Thailand: the monarchy.

Perhaps it makes sense for the new government to obscure its predecessor's achievements while stealing its best clothes. The question is why the UNDP thinks it should provide cover for this whitewash by puffing the sufficiency economy as a miracle-cure for the developing world's woes. The answer is that the UNDP is a sucker for this sort of new-age waffle, especially if it has royal patronage. It has also lauded the not entirely dissimilar “Gross National Happiness” theory of Bhutan's King Jigme Singye Wangchuk.

In publishing such an unbalanced report on a theory that is untried on a national level, the UNDP has abandoned all sense of objectivity. It is also lending legitimacy to a regime that took power by force. Hakan Bjorkman, the UNDP's deputy chief in Thailand, says it wanted to provoke a debate. But no such debate is possible in Thailand, because sufficiency theory is the king's philosophy and anything remotely critical of it could be seen as lèse-majesté, punishable with jail.

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